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Abstract
This tutorial summarises the use of Bayesian analysis and Bayes fac-
tors for nding signicant properties of discrete (categorical and ordinal)
data. It overviews methods for nding dependencies and graphical mod-
els, latent variables, robust decision trees and association rules.
1 Introduction
Data mining is complementary to Bayesian data analysis. Whereas data mining
is often seen as the problem of grinding through massive data sets for the purpose
of nding unexpected dependencies in the form of correlations, association rules
and segmentations, Bayesian data analysis is typically seen as an activity of
evaluating detailed models for small data sets. We are interested in the middle
ground, where data is scarce enough to pose delicate questions of validity and
signicance of our ndings, but where we do not yet have detailed mathematical
models. We are developing tools and methodology for exploratory analysis of
small and fragile data sets, as a preparatory step for a more detailed analysis,
as can be performed in the Bayesian framework with, e.g., the BUGS system
[33].
The application area is human brain research. Here, many dierent types of
data are recorded for patients and for healthy control persons. Besides results
of established and well standardized tests and background data, many results
from imaging investigations (measuring cell structure, blood ow, receptor pres-
ence, etc.) are entered as extracted features of images mapped to brain atlases.
Genetic data related to brain development is also emerging. Some data entered
are uncertain, others are being standardized. We seldom have a complete data
set for any individual, since the data collection process is costly and often infea-
sible for patients in bad condition. The objective of data mining on these data
are deeper understanding of the interplay between physiological and psychiatric
conditions, and also improved procedures for diagnosing patients and choosing
therapies.
The purpose of this report is to explain the advantage of the Bayesian ap-
proach in the present application, and how the Bayes factor can be an almost
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universal tool for choosing between models, and to show how models can dis-
play the information or knowledge we are after in an application. It is also our
intention to give a full account of the computations required. It can serve as a
survey of the area, although it focuses on techniques being investigated in the
present project. Several of the computations we describe have been analysed
at length, although not exactly in the way and with the same conclusions as
found here. The contribution here is a systematic treatment that is conned to
pure Bayesian analysis and puts several established data mining methods in a
joint Bayesian framework. We do not want to enter the discussion of why the
Bayesian approach is superior to its alternatives, but some background material
is included. We will see that, although many computations of Bayesian data-
mining are straightforward, one soon reaches problems where dicult integrals
have to be evaluated, and presently only Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods are available. There are several recent books describing the Bayesian
method from both a theoretical[3], an ideological[19, 32] and an application
oriented[7] perspective. A main historic inuence leading to increased interest
in Bayesian methods is Harold Jereys, who wrote particularly two books on
scientic inference and probability theory from a Bayesian perspective[21, 20].
A current survey of MCMC methods, which can solve some complex evaluations
required in Bayesian modeling, can be found in the book[17]. Books explaining
theory and use of graphical models are Lauritzen[22], Cox and Wermuth[10],
and Whittaker[35]. A tutorial on Bayesian network approaches to data mining
is found in (Heckermann[18]). This present report describes data mining in a
relational data structure with discrete data (discrete data matrix) and the sim-
plest generalizations to numerical data. A second part will describe general real
valued data matrices, raster data representing, e.g., scalar and/or vector elds,
as well as time series and strings.
2 Data model
We consider a data matrix where rows are cases and columns are variables. In
our application, the row is associated with a person or an investigation (pa-
tient and date). The columns describe a large number of variables that could
be recorded, such as background data (occupation, sex, age, etc), and numbers
extracted from investigations made, like sizes of brain regions, receptor densi-
ties and blood ow by region, etc. Categorical data can be equipped with a
condence (probability that the recorded datum is correct), and numerical data
with an error bar. Every datum can be recorded as missing, and the reason
for missing data can be related to patients condition or external factors (like
equipment unavailability or time and cost constraints). Only the latter type of
missing data is (at least approximately) unrelated to the domain of investiga-
tion. On the level of exploratory analysis we conne ourselves to discrete and
multivariate normal distributions, with Dirichlet and inverse Wishart priors. In
this way, no delicate and costly MCMC methods will be required until miss-
ing data and/or segmentation is introduced. If the data do not satisfy these
conditions (e.g., normality for a real variable), they may do so after suitable
transformation and/or segmentation. Another approach is to ignore the distri-
bution over the real line and regard a numerical attribute as an ordinal one, i.e.,
considering only the ordering between values. Such ordinal data also appear
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naturally in applications where subjects are asked to grade a quantity, like their
appreciation of a phenomenon in organized society or their valuation of their
own emotions.
2.1 Multivariate data models
Given a data matrix, the rst question that arises concerns the relationships
between its variables(columns). Could some pairs of variables be considered
independent, or do the data indicate that there is a connection between them -
either directly causal, mediated through another variable, or introduced through
sampling bias? These questions are analyzed using graphical models, directed
or decomposable[24]. As an example, in gure 1 M
1
indicates a model where
A and B are dependent, whereas they are independent in model M
2
. In gure
2, we describe a directed graphical model M
00
4
indicating that variables A and
B are independently determined, but the value of C will be dependent on the
values for A and B. The similar decomposable model M
4
indicates that the
dependence of A and B is completely explained by the mediation of variable
C. We could think of the data generation process as determining A, then C
dependent on A and last B dependent on C, or equivalently, determining rst
C and then A dependent on C and B dependent on C.
M1
M1’
M2
M2’
A
A
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B
B
B
Figure 1: Graphical models, dependence or independence?
Bayesian analysis of graphical models involves selecting all or some graphs
on the variables, dependent on prior information, and comparing their posterior
probabilities with respect to the data matrix. A set of highest posterior proba-
bility models usually gives many clues to the data dependencies[23, 24], although
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Figure 2: Graphical models
one must - as always in statistics - constantly remember that dependencies are
not necessarily causalities.
A second question that arises concerns the relationships between rows (cases)
in the data matrix. Are the cases built up from distinguishable classes, so that
each class has its data generated from a simpler graphical model than that of
the whole data set? In the simplest case these classes can be directly read o
in the graphical model. In a data matrix where inter-variable dependencies are
well explained by the model M
4
, if C is a categorical variable taking only few
values, splitting the rows by the value of C could give a set of data matrices
in each of which A and B might be independent. However, the interesting
cases are where the classes cannot be directly seen in a graphical model because
then the classes are not trivially derivable. If the data matrix of the example
contained only variables A and B, because C was unavailable or unknown to
interfere with A and B, the highest posterior probability graphical model might
be one with a link from A to B. The classes would still be there, but since C
would be latent or hidden, the classes would have to be derived from the A and
B variables only. A dierent case of classication is where the values of one
numerical variable are drawn from several normal distributions with dierent
means and variances. The full column would t very badly to any single normal
distribution, but after classication, each class could have a set of values tting
well to a normal distribution. The problem of identifying classes is known as
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unsupervised classication. One comprehensive system for classication based
on Bayesian methodology is described by Cheeseman and Stutz[8].
A third question - often the one of highest practical concern - is whether some
designated variable can be reliably predicted in the sense that it is well related
to combinations of values of other variables, not only in the data matrix, but
also with high condence in new cases that are presented. This question leads
to another concept that has been extensively studied, namely association rules.
Consider a data matrix well described by modelM
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in gure 2. It is conceivable
that the value of C is a good predictor of variable B, and better than A. It also
seems likely that knowing both A and C is of little help compared to knowing
only C, because the inuence of A on B is completely mediated by C. On the
other hand, if we want to predict C, it is well conceivable that knowing both A
and B is better than knowing only one of them.
Finally, it is possible that a data matrix with many categorical variables
with many values gives a scattered matrix with very few cases compared to the
number of potentially dierent cases. Generalization is a technique by which a
coarsening of the data matrix can yield better insight, such as replacing the age
and sex variables by the categories kids, young men, adults and seniors in a car
insurance application. The question of relevant generalization is clearly related
to the problems of nding association rules and to classication. For ordinal
variables, this line of inquiry leads naturally to the concept of decision trees,
that can be thought of as a recursive splitting of the data matrix by the size of
one of its ordinal variables.
3 Bayesian analysis, uninformative priors, and
over-tting
A natural procedure for estimating dependencies among categorical variables
is by means of conditional probabilities estimated as frequencies in the data
matrix. Likewise, correlations can be used to nd dependencies among real
valued variables. Such procedures usually lead to selection of the more detailed
models and give poor generalizing performance, in the sense that new sets of
data are likely to have completely dierent dependencies. Various penalty terms
have been tried to avoid over-tting. However, the Bayesian method has a built-
in mechanism that favors the simplest models compatible with the data, and also
selects more detailed models as the amount of data increases. The procedure
is to compare posterior model probabilities, where the posterior probability
of a model is obtained by combining its prior distribution of parameters with
the probability of the data as a function of the parameters, using Bayes rule.
Thus, if p
1
(
1
) is the prior pdf of the parameter (set) 
1
of model M
1
and
the probability of obtaining the case (row of data matrix) d is p(djM
1

1
), then
the probability in model M
1
of the data matrix D containing the ordered cases
fd
i
g
i2I
is:
p(DjM
1
) =
Z
Y
i2I
p(d
i
jM
1

1
)p(
1
)d
1
; (1)
and the posterior probability of model M
1
given the data D is, by Bayes
rule:
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p(M
1
jD) = p(DjM
1
)p(M
1
)=p(D): (2)
From a frequentist or orthodox statistical point of view it is questionable to
do this interchange and consider the probability of a model given the data. This
is exactly what makes the dierence between Bayesian and frequentist methods.
If the data matrix is unordered, one should multiply with a multinomial coe-
cient, but this is often not done - whether or not this is done does not matter for
computation of Bayes factors, see below. Two models M
1
and M
2
can now be
related with respect to the data by the Bayes factor p(DjM
1
)=p(DjM
2
). This
is a factor which is multiplied with the prior odds between the two models,
p(M
1
)=p(M
2
), to get the posterior odds p(M
1
jD)=p(M
2
jD). The posterior odds
can now take the place of a new prior for the next data batch, and the procedure
can be repeated. It should be noted, however, that the model averaging is done
for each batch - whether this is appropriate or not depends on the application,
and often it is not.
A high value of the Bayes factor, say more than 100, speaks strongly in
favor of model M
1
, like a value below .01 gives strong support for M
2
. Values
closer to one (i.e. in the range .3 to 3 ), however, tell us that the data are
insucient to decide between the models, and this is unavoidable - methods that
decide in those cases cannot be well designed. This appears to be a signicant
dierence between the Bayesian approach and many analyses occurring in AI
and data mining - we do not consider our data as an imperfect image of an ideal
underlying and completely precise probability model. On the contrary, we ask
which imperfect underlying models best serve to describe our data. If we tried
to get much more data than we have, we would not necessarily become wiser,
since the data collection process may well be such that cases are not independent
and the data collection process may change the nature of the data through the
sampling process.
A disturbing feature of the Bayesian methodology is that it requires prior
distributions. Priors give an impression of subjectivity, which they should not
do. The prior is an assessment of a state of information, and is not related to a
subject except that the information state is possessed by a subject. Often the
information state is dicult to deal with since its form is fairly open-ended -
just imagine information related to an open mathematical problem, or even an
NP -hard optimization problem. However, every well-founded choice between
alternatives must involve the prior beliefs of - objectively the state of informa-
tion held by - the decision maker in some way, and the Bayesian method is one
(in fact the only) consistent way of doing this. Bayesian methodology provides
an expedient for the case where no strong prior beliefs should inuence the
conclusion, namely uninformative or weakly informative priors. For such prior
distributions, more data is typically needed to reach a denite conclusion than
for cases where there is distinct prior information to include in the analysis.
With the Bayesian method there is no need to penalize more detailed models to
avoid over-tting - if M
2
is more detailed than M
1
in the sense of having more
parameters to t, then the parameter dimension is larger in M
2
and p(
1
) is
larger than p(
2
), which automatically penalizes M
2
against M
1
. This auto-
matic penalization has been found appropriate in many application cases, and
should be complemented by explicit prior model probabilities only when there is
concrete prior information that justies it, or when the data is too abundant to
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select a model simple enough to comprehend. Asymptotically, the penalization
of detailed models implicit in the Bayes factor approach is a factor n2
(p
1
 p
2
)
,
where n is the number of data points (cases) and p
i
is the number of parameters
in model M
i
. This estimate was rst found by Schwarz[31], and is known, when
used to penalize more detailed models in a likelihood based model comparison,
as the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). So deciding between the models
using the likelihood ratios with the BIC as a penalizing factor is an approxima-
tion to the 'orthodox Bayesian' procedure of comparing posterior probabilities,
and it is useful when the integration required for posterior determination is in-
feasible or otherwise unwanted. Some discussions of this point can be found in
(Ch 24 of Jaynes[19]) and also in Neal[25].
The discussion above relates to choosing one of two models. Clearly, there
is a possibility that the data discredits both these models, or that we have a
whole family of models to choose from.
Consider the problem of comparing models in a family, fM
1
; : : : ;M
k
g, and
having no prior preference for any of them. If the models do not overlap, we
should choose the probabilities fp(M
i
jD)=
P
j
p(M
j
jD)g as the probabilities of
these models given the data. By overlapping we mean that parameter sets of
prior non-zero probability exist which give the same distribution in two models.
We usually do not have overlap, since, e.g., in the case of nested models the
region of overlap, the whole 'less specic' model, has prior probability zero in
the more specic model. Typically, a nested family forming a tree or directed
acyclic graph structure is chosen, where the dimension of the parameter space
increases as one descends in the tree, and where the root is associated with the
fewest parameters. The root model is the least specic one in the family.
In the modeling eort, the analyst must decide on grounds of what is known
in general terms about the application and the purpose of the analysis, which
model family to consider. Here we must remember that inference is not an
idle activity, but should normally be used to make decisions. Clearly, it is not
adequate to select a model from its posterior probability without considering
the consequences of decisions. In Bayesian decision theory (see, e.g., (Berger[1]),
we introduce actions and expected utility of actions given a 'state of the world',
which could be a model or a model with its parameter. However, in Bayesian
decision theory, the rational decision making follows from only the posterior and
the utility functions (statisticians seem to be a pessimistic breed and usually
talk about loss functions, but this is of course really the same thing). For this
reason we do not introduce loss functions in this report.
3.1 The Bayesian debate and the unavoidability of Bayesian
analysis
There was a quite heated debate among statisticians on the proper application
of mathematical tools in the interpretation of experimental data. This debate
started between Fisher and Pearsson and continued between Fisher and Jereys.
What is most remembered is the discussion between Bayesians and 'frequentists'
(as traditional statisticians were called by Bayesians). For a trained pure math-
ematician the controversy between frequentist and Bayesian views does simply
not appear. He is interested in abstract spaces with probability measures, and
leaves interpretation of real world phenomena to others.
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The strong feelings among Bayesians on their infallibility has created adverse
reactions among statisticians and also recently in the AI community. Bayesians
are known for their arrogance and claim to own the truth. It is unfortunate that
this claim is not presented in many textbooks, because it is easy to understand,
and also quite surprising. It is generally agreed that Bayes original paper is
deep and challenging, but it is also too vague and incoherent to be convincing,
and many readers have rejected it outright. There is apparently no documented
evidence that Laplace actually saw the paper or heard of it, but the work of
Laplace is a continuation of the ideas in Bayes work. Unfortunately, he did not
succeed to convince his colleagues and successors in the scientic community.
His idea of the rule of succession is a clear application of Bayesian analysis, but
it was rejected because his readers did not accept his choice of prior informa-
tion (deciding the number of days, all with sunrise, since creation, by reading
the Bible) and discarded the method on the basis of one dubious application.
Obviously, if the Bible is reliable on this point, other information on the order
of Nature found in it might contradict his application. Other sources of prior
information were known by Laplace, but he did not use them for this purpose.
Several great 19th century mathematicians have more or less by instinct used
the ideas of Bayes and Laplace when performing computations on experimental
data (typically in astronomy), but these eorts were more or less ignored when
the discipline of statistics was created in the early 20th century.
The rst derivation of the necessity of Bayesian methods was done by R. T.
Cox in 1946[11], and has been repackaged by Jaynes with a lot of motivating
discussion. Basically, the analysis investigates which family of rules for reasoning
with the plausibility of statements about the world is permissible in the sense
that they satisfy the following criteria:
 I: The plausibility of a statement is a real number and dependent on
information we have on the plausibility of other statements.
 II: Consistency - If the plausibility of a statement can be derived in two
ways, the two results must be equal.
 III: Common sense - Some properties of statements known to be true or
known to be false, and continuity rules.
From these criteria follows that any permissible way to reason with plausi-
bility is equivalent to Bayesian analysis.
A very short outline follows, were we do not in fact show that the Bayesian
method satises the criteria (this is not usually questioned):
Let A, B, C, ... be statements, combinable with the invisible logicaland
operator: AB means A and B. The negation of a statement A is written A.
Statements must in some way be considered objective and relate to states of the
world, and have an agreed interpretation. Let AjC be the plausibility of A given
the additional information that C is true. C is thus the context in which we
consider the plausibility of A. That such a notation must be present in every
calculus to derive plausibility is clear - there must for example be a way to
relate a measured value(AjC) to the reality behind it (BjC) using background
information on the measurement process and its accuracy (C). Numerical values
- parameters, measured values, etc. - enter this framework by a limit process.
We cannot start with innite domains and directly put plausibility measures on
them.
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Consider the possible ways to compute ABjC: it must be a function of two or
more of the plausibilities AjC, BjAC, BjC and AjBC. It can be shown that we
must consider either BjAC and AjC or AjBC and BjC - any other alternative
can be shown inadequate by violating common sense in some situation. As an
example we cannot derive the plausibility of ABjC from only the plausibilities
of AjC and BjC, since that gives us no means to consider how A and B relate
to each other- it would force us to assume, for example, that the plausibility
of a person having a left blue and a right brown eye would depend only on the
plausibilities of left blue and right brown eye, and not allowing us to consider
the dependency between these two statements.
Thus, we can assume that the plausibility of ABjC is a function of the
plausibilities of AjC and BjAC, the other case being a natural consequence of
the commutativity of the and operator:
ABjC = F (AjC;BjAC): (3)
The common sense requirement tells us that the function F must be continuous,
and monotonously increasing in both its arguments. It can have a stationary
point for its rst argument only if the second argument represents impossibility
and vice versa. We assume it twice continiously dierentiable, although there
exists a fairly complex proof that this is not necessary for our conclusions[19].
Now we consider the consistency requirement. Since the and operator is not
only commutative but also associative, ABC = (AB)C = A(BC), we can derive
a consistency requirement for F :
ABCjD = F (ABjCD;CjD) = F (AjBCD;BCjD): (4)
Expanding once more, we get:
F (F (AjBCD;BjCD); CjD) = F (AjBCD;F (BjCD;CjD)): (5)
This must hold for any statements A;B;C;D, and thus F must satisfy the
following functional equation in its range of denition:
F (x; F (y; z)) = F (F (x; y); z): (6)
The above is called the equation of associativity. The trivial constant so-
lution is clearly useless. Which non-trivial solutions are there? We can dif-
ferentiate equation (6) with respect to x, y and z, and see that the follow-
ing equality holds, i.e., the left side is independent of z (we use the notation
F
1
(x; y) =
@F (x;y)
@x
):
F
2
(x; F (y; z))F
1
(y; z)=F
1
(x; F (y; z)) = F
2
(x; y)=F
1
(x; y): (7)
Let G(x; y) = F
2
(x; y)=F
1
(x; y) and we nd F
1
(y; z)G(x; F (y; z)) = G(x; y),
and the left side of this (which is algebraically independent of z) we denote
U . Likewise, after a little algebra: G(x; f(y; z))F
2
(y; z) = G(x; y)G(y; z), and
the left side we denote by V . Now @V=@y is identical to @U=@z and thus zero,
since U is independent of z. But then V which can be written G(x; y)G(y; z),
is independent of y. This can only happen if G(y; z) and 1=G(x; y) have a
common factor dependent on y, and no other dependence on y. So we must have
G(y; z) = H(y)E(z) and G(x; y) = E
0
(x)=H(y) so we also have, by substituting
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y for x and z for y in the latter: G(y; z) = E
0
(y)=H(z). In other words, G
must have the form G(x; y) = rH(x)=H(y), and this is also by denition equal
to F
2
(x; y)=F
1
(x; y). This is what we need to separate variables and put the
diferential of v = F (x; y) on an integrable form:
dv
H(v)
=
dx
H(x)
+ r
dy
H(y)
(8)
which can be integrated using w(x)  exp(
R
1
dx
H(x)
) to:
w(F (x; y)) = w(x)w
r
(y) (9)
but the equation of associativy also gives us
w(F (x; y); z) = w(x)w
r
(y)w
r
(z) = w(F (x; F (y; z))) = w(x)(w(y)w(z))
r
(10)
and in every non-trivial and useful case we must have r = 1. We can now
investigate what w(x) must be when x represents truth or falsity, and we get
w(x) = w(x)w(T ), w(F ) = w(x)w(F ) and some more conditions we do not have
to use. It is possible that the values 1 and  1 are obtained since truth and
falsity might be considered a limit case. The rst condition yields w(T ) = 1,
the other could mean either w(F ) = 0 or w(F ) =1 ( 1 is ruled out since we
cannot allow w(x) to pass zero in its way from w(T ) to w(F )). But the solution
going from 1 to 1 can be replaced by its inverse, which goes from 1 to 0. We
are now very close to probability rules, since the function w goes from 0 for
impossibility to 1 for truth, and our rule for the conjunction of statements can
be written
w(ABjC) = w(AjBC)w(BjC) (11)
It now remains to nd out how plausibilities of complements must be treated.
Since AA is always false and either of A or A must be true, the plausibility of
A must be a function of the plausibility of A. Introduce the function S on the
unit interval: S : [0; 1]! [0; 1], such that w(AjC) = S(w(AjC)). By considering
Aristotelian logic, and our choice of w(T ) = 1 and w(F ) = 0, and reasonable
common sense, we nd that S is a monotone and continuous function decreasing
from 1 to 0 on the unit interval. We will assume that S is dierentiable - again
this is not necessary but it is almost required by common sense and simplies
the argument. Also, since A = A, we have S(S(x)) = x. This is not all, however,
because S must also be consistent with the product rule:
w(ABjC) = w(AjC)w(BjAC) = w(AjC)S(w(B jAC)) (12)
w(ABjC) = w(AjC)w(B jAC) = w(AjC)S(w(BjAC)) (13)
Rearranging these constraints and using the commutativity AB = BA we
nd w(ABjC) = w(AjC)S(w(B jAC)) = w(AjC)S(w(AB jC)=w(AjC)), and
w(AjC)S(
w(AB jC)
w(AjC)
) = w(BjC)S(
w(BAjC)
w(BjC)
): (14)
Equation (14) must hold for all statements A, B, and C. In particular,
choose B such that B = AD, and now AB = B and BA = A. Introducing
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the abbreviations x  w(AjC) and y  w(BjC). After a little work we nd the
fundamental equation governing the possible functions S:
xS(
S(y)
x
) = yS(
S(x)
y
); S(y)  x (15)
The analysis of this equation is not entirely trivial, but it can readily be
veried that among its solutions are the (easily obtainable) solutions to the
simple equation:
S(x)
m
+ x
m
= 1;m > 0: (16)
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Figure 3: Sample solutions to (16).
For the dierent values of m, the curve family will cover the interior of
the unit square (see gure 3). It is also easy, by consideriung the choice y =
S(x)+ as ! 0, to see that S is governed by a rst order dierential equation.
Therefore, there are no more solutions than these. It might seem odd that the
solution S(x) = 1  x is not the only one, since it would t well with equation
(11) and the choice of w(AjC) as the probability of AjC. However, by taking the
mth power of equation (11), we nd that we can still interpret all possible ways
to compute with plausibilities as Bayesian analysis, simply by letting probability
correspond to w(AjC)
m
.
The next question in this line of inquiry concerns proper choices of priors -
we have no help whatsoever in the preceding discussion. Building a repertoire
of methods to assign priors would start with simple symmetry considerations:
If I have no background knowledge whatsoever to nd dierences in plausibility
between a set of n exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, then the prior proba-
bility of each should be set to the same value and the probabilities should sum
to one. Thus, each hypothesis will have prior probability 1=n. This leads to
the standard assignments for coin tossing and urn drawing experiments consid-
ered in basic probability texts. Translating this rule, by limit forming opera-
tions, to pdfs with continuous parameter spaces leads naturally to the concept
of minimum-information (maximum entropy) priors, which have revolutionized
the methods for analyzing physics data and is spreading to other sciences. We
do not describe this revolution here, see e.g. Jaynes[19]. A remaining problem
is that we simply cannot consider all possible hypotheses. This means that the
set of hypotheses we actually consider must in some sense be realistic. This
is a problem that is the key problem that must get a convincing solution in
every single application before meaningful application related conclusions can
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be drawn. The models considered in this report are very general and have been
found applicable to many dierent problems as a rst quantitative grinding of
the collected data. However, once the big lines have been uncovered, there is
usually plenty of scope for investigating more specic and application related
models.
3.2 An educational example: Tossing a coin
When it comes to the interpretation of experimental outcomes, we can illustrate
the controversy with an example that has been discussed frequently by statis-
ticians, rst by Lindley (see, e.g.,[7, 32, 19]): Assume we toss a coin 12 times
and observe the outcome ttthhtttttth, where t means tail and h means head.
We are interested in what this means for our objective of learning whether or
not the coin is fair. The probability of this sequence for a fair coin is 0:5
12
as
it is for any other sequence of 12 tosses. So it does not seem extraordinary,
nor does a sequence consisting of millions of heads only, because it also has
the same probability as any other sequence of the same length. The frequen-
tists approach is to dene a test. We order the possible outcomes linearly or
map them to the real line, and this induces a pdf of a real-valued quantity. If
the current outcome lies far out on the tail of this distribution, we reject the
hypothesis that the coin is fair. It is accepted that a 5% cuto can be used,
and this gives us a 5% risk of rejecting a true hypothesis. Of course the map
of outcomes to the real line must be dened in some impartial way, essentially
before we have seen the actual outcome. Typically, at least if we are more con-
cerned with fairness than with independence, we choose the number of tails in
the sequence, which has a binomial distribution. The probability of 9 or more
tails in 12 tosses of a fair coin is slightly more than 5% (
P
12
i=9
 
12
j

2
 12
= :075),
so we could reasonably assume that the coin is fair. There is a very fundamental
problem with this approach, however, and that is that we made an assumption
about the possible unobserved outcomes that is not justied. We just assumed
that the outcome is one of the possible outcomes when tossing 12 times. The
actual sequence observed does not exclude the possibility that the experimenter
tossed the coin until he had 3 heads. If that were the case we should instead
compute the distribution of the number of tails seen before the third head. This
distribution is dierent, particularly it admits arbitrarily large values. A rapid
calculation shows that with this rule we should reject the null hypothesis at the
5% level for the same outcome of the experiment (the probability of 9 or more
tails is
P
1
i=9
 
j+2
j

2
 (j+3)
= :0325). This dependence on the unknown experi-
mental design violates a fundamental statistical principle saying that only the
likelihood of the observed data can inuence our belief in a hypothesis. This
principle, the Likelihood Principle, was proposed by Fisher and Barnard, but it
was rst given a detailed analysis by Birnbaum in 1962[5]. In the subsequent
debate, frequentists have proposed that the Likelihood Principle is not applica-
ble in this case and that the experimental design could in practise be relevant
information. A Bayesian only admits that the probability, under the fairness
assumption, of the outcome observed is 0:5
12
= :000244 and that the probability
of 9 tails is a factor
 
12
9

larger. In order to evaluate the experiment he needs
prior beliefs. Such prior belief could be an alternative model, dened before the
experiment is observed. If the alternative model is that the coin gives tails with
probability 2=3, then the probability is :000963 and the probability of 3 heads
12
under the alternative model is again a factor
 
12
9

larger. So a Bayes factor of
3.9 in favor of the alternative hypothesis is observed, and the Bayesian starting
out with no preference (probability 1=2 for each alternative) would end up with
a preference for the alternative which could be quantied as probability .8 for
the unfair alternative and .2 for the fair alternative. This preference should not
be regarded as a rejection of the less believed alternative, but can easily be re-
versed by more information. There is a tempting alternative hypothesis in this
case, namely that the true probability is the observed frequency, .75 for tails.
This model has the highest probability (:001173) of those alternatives assuming
independent outcomes. Even higher (probability 1) we reach if we assume that
the observed sequence is the only possible outcome and that the tosses were
not independent - but now we have denitely used the data too much, since we
would probably not designate this hypothesis as a major alternative before the
experiment.
Now, let the alternative hypothesis be: The probability of tails is a number
. Figure 4 shows the probability of the outcome as a function of . We do
not know anything about , but we must assume some distribution of it. One
obvious alternative is the uniform distribution. This gives the model probability
R
1
0

9
(1   )
3
d = :00035. The resulting Bayes factor is 1.4 in favor of the
hypothesis of unfairness, much weaker than 4.9 for the maximum likelihood
hypothesis ( = 0:75). A Bayesian with no prior preference of the hypotheses
fair against unfair would end up by assigning probability 0.411 to the fair and
.589 to the unfair hypothesis.
Figure 4: Posterior frequency distribution
It might seem unreasonable to let the probabilities less than 1=2 water out
our belief in unfairness when data clearly suggest that the probability, if it is
not 1=2, is greater. Let us split the unfairness case into two and consider three
models: M
l
- bias for heads; M
f
- fair; M
h
- bias for tails. We again assume
a uniform distribution of  in the intervals 0 to 1/2 for M
l
and in 1/2 to 1
for M
h
. A similar calculation leads to the posterior probabilities 0.034, 0.259
and 0.706, respectively. Clearly, by separating the unfairness hypothesis into low
and high bias, we decreased our belief in the fairness alternative. Unfortunately,
this is to some extent an illusion. The real reason why our posterior belief in
the fairness decreased is that our prior belief in fairness decreased when we
replaced two equally believable hypothesis (prior probability 1/2 each) by three
equally believable hypotheses (prior probability 1/3 each). It would be equally
possible to split the 1/2 belief in unfairness into two unfairness alternatives with
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1/4 prior probability each, and then the posterior belief in fairness would not
change. This is one example of non-robustness problems appearing when doing
Bayesian analyses with weak priors.
In any case, this is a result that seems much weaker than the frequentists
ability to reject the fairness assumption given the information that the exper-
imenter tossed the coin until 3 heads were observed. In 'fairness' it should be
noted that the two views would yield similar results if 120 tosses were made with
30 observed heads: The Bayes factor would be 10
6
in favor of unfairness and
the level of the frequency test would be 10
 7
 two equally convincing reasons
to reject the fairness assumption.
The process of dividing the unfairness case into two can be continued, and
in the limit we obtain the concept of a posterior distribution for  over the unit
interval. This analysis is carried out, with a number of nice graphical results, by
Sivia[32]. The resulting posterior with a uniform prior, t tails and h heads is the
normalized likelihood function, the Beta distribution, p(jh; t) = c
t
(1 )
h
.
In the next section we will perform a generalized derivation, where we allow
more than 2 outcomes: we go from a Bernoulli distribution to a general discrete
distribution, and we use the more general Dirichlet conjugate family instead of
Beta distributions.
There is no mathematical reason to reject one of the frequentist or Bayesian
approaches. Bayesians accused frequentists for not accepting probability as
dependent on information, whereas frequentists accused Bayesians for putting
up with the non-robustness caused by dependence on prior information. Ad-
mittedly, it is dicult to translate prior information to prior probability, but
Bayesians claim that it is unavoidable. Whether the frequentists reliance on
experimental design is worse than the Bayesians reliance on priors is of course
impossible to say without a lot of experience. Several other arguments have
been put forward in this debate, but those above seem to be the most critical.
Today, Bayesian views are gaining ground, perhaps largely due to interest from
the AI camp, where several less convincing ways to deal with imprecise infor-
mation have been tried. Although we promote the pure Bayesian view in this
report, it must be remembered that anyone investigating real data must explore
it from many angles, in order to avoid being mislead by too constrained or in-
appropriate models. In practice such explorations are perhaps best performed
with various visualization tools. An old saying is that a proper visaulization
hits the investigator between his eyes with the truth. There is some truth in
this.
4 Graphical model choice - local analysis
We will analyze a number of models involving two or three variables of cate-
gorical type, as a preparation to the task of determining likely decomposable
or directed graphical models. First, consider the case of two variables, A and
B, and our task is to determine whether or not these variables are dependent.
Since we know that Bayes method is the only method that gives us the right
answer, we already know how to proceed. We must dene one model M
2
that
captures the concept of independence, and one model M
1
that captures the
concept of dependence, and ask which one produced our data. The Bayes factor
is P (DjM
2
)=P (DjM
1
) in favor of dependence, and it will be multiplied with
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the prior odds (which we, lacking prior information in this general setting, as-
sume is one) to get the posterior odds. There is some latitude in dening the
data model for dependence and independence, but they lead us to quite similar
computations, as we shall see.
Let d
A
and d
B
be the number of possible values for A and B, respectively.
It is natural to regard categorical data as produced by a discrete probability
distribution, and then it is convenient to assume Dirichlet distributions for the
parameters (probabilities of the possible outcomes) of the distribution.
We will nd that this analysis is the key step in determining a full graphical
model for the data matrix. Our analysis is analogous to those of Dawid and
Lauritzen[12] and Madigan and Raftery[24], but their analyses are in many ways
more general and use a likelihood approach with penalization of detailed models
using the BIC criterion and other similar techniques.
For a discrete distribution over d values, the parameter set is a sequence
of probabilities x = (x
1
; : : : x
d
), constrained by 0  x
i
and
P
i
x
i
= 1 (often
the last parameter x
d
is omitted - it is determined by the rst d   1 ones). A
prior distribution over x is the conjugate Dirichlet distribution with a parameter
set  = (
i
)
d
i=1
, constrained by 0  
i
. Then the Dirichlet distribution with
parameter set  is Di(xj) =
Q
i
x
(
i
 1)
i
 (
P
i

i
)=
Q
i
 (
i
), where  (n + 1) =
n! for natural number n. The normalizing constant  (
P
i

i
)=
Q
i
 (
i
) gives
a useful mnemonic for integrating
Q
i
x
(
i
 1)
i
over the d   1-dimensional unit
cube (with x
d
= 1  
P
x
i
). It is very convenient to use Dirichlet priors, for
the posterior is also a Dirichlet distribution: After having obtained data with
frequency count n we just add it to the prior parameter vector  to get the
posterior parameter vector  + n. It is also easy to handle priors that are
mixtures of Dirichlets, because the mixing propagates through and we only need
to mix the posteriors of the components to get the posterior of the mixture. We
do not need this here, however.
With no specic prior information for x, it is necessary from symmetry
considerations to assume all Dirichlet parameters equal, 
i
= . A convenient
prior is the uniform prior (  = 1 ). This is, e.g, the prior used by Laplace to
derive the rule of succession, see Ch 18 of [19]. Other priors have been used, e.g.,
 = 1=2 in the case d = 2, which is a minimum information (Jereys) prior.
The value  = 1=2 has also been used for d > 2(Madigan and Raftery[24]).
Cheeseman and Stutz[8] report the use of  = 1+1=d. Experiments have shown
little dierence between these choices, but it is easy to see that Jereys prior
promotes x
i
close to 0 or 1 somewhat whereas  = 1 + 1=d penalizes extreme
probabilities. If we get signicant dierences between dierent uninformative
priors this warrants a closer investigation on the adequacy of data and modeling
assumptions. We will mostly use the uniform prior. In many cases an experts
delibered prior information can be expressed as an equivalent sample that is
just added to the data matrix, and then this modied matrix can be analyzed
with the uniform prior. Likewise, a number of experts can be mixed to form a
mixture prior. If the data has occurrence vector (n
i
)
d
i=1
for the d possible data
values in a case, and n = n
:
=
P
i
n
i
, then the probability for these data given
the discrete distribution parameters x, is
p(njx) =

n
n
1
; : : : ; n
d

Y
i
x
n
i
i
: (17)
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You should note that many derivations found in the literature drop the multi-
nomial coecient. This would give the probability not of getting a particular
contingency table (data matrix), but a given ordered sample with the frequency
counts n
i
. The dierence between these two views disappears when the multi-
nomial coecients cancel in the division leading to Bayes factors. Integrating
out the x
i
with the prior gives the probability of the data given model M (M
is characterized by a parameterized probability distribution and a prior on its
parameters):
p
J
(njM) =
Z
p(njx)p(x)dx
=
Z

n
n
1
; : : : ; n
d

Y
i
x
n
i
i
Y
i
x

i
 1
i
 (
:
)
Q
i
 (
i
)
dx
=

n
n
1
; : : : ; n
d

 (d)
 ()
d
Q
i
 (n
i
+ )
 (n+ d)
(18)
=
 (n+ 1) (d)
Q
i
 (n
i
+ )
 ()
d
 (n+ d)
Q
i
 (n
i
+ 1)
: (19)
As is easily seen, the uniform prior gives a probability for each sample size
that is independent of the actual data:
p
u
(njM) =
 (n+ 1) (d)
 (n+ d)
: (20)
Consider now the data matrix over A and B. Let n
ij
be the number of
rows with value i for A and value j for B. Let n
:j
and n
i:
be the marginal
counts where we have summed over the 'dotted' index, and n = n
::
=
P
ij
n
ij
.
Let model M
1
(gure 1) be the model where the A and B value for a row is
combined to a categorical variable ranging over d
A
d
B
dierent values, with a
Jereys or uniform prior. The probability of the data given M
1
is obtained by
replacing the products and replacing d by d
A
d
B
in equations (19) and (20):
p
J
(njM
1
) =
 (n+ 1) (d
A
d
B

AB
)
Q
ij
 (n
ij
+ 
AB
)
 (
AB
)
d
A
d
B
 (n+ d
AB
)
Q
ij
 (n
ij
+ 1)
; (21)
p
u
(njM
1
) =
 (n+ 1) (d
A
d
B
)
 (n+ d
A
d
B
)
: (22)
We could also consider a dierent model M
0
1
, where the A column is gener-
ated rst and then the B column is generated for each value of A in turn. With
uniform priors we get:
p
u
(njM
0
1
) =
 (n+ 1) (d
A
) (d
B
)
d
A
 (n+ d
A
)
Y
i
 (n
i:
+ 1)
 (n
i:
+ d
B
)
(23)
Observe that we are not allowed to decide between the undirected M
1
and
the directed model M
0
1
based on equations (22) and (23). This is because these
models dene the same set of pdf:s involving A and B, the dierence lying only
in the structure of parameter space and parameter priors. They overlap on a
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set of prior probability one. Nonetheless, this computation is sometimes done,
and it might be useful for seeing how well data t the two parameterizations
and parameter priors. A dierence compared to real Bayes factors is that we
cannot resolve the hypothesis by taking more data. The factor just measures
relative stretch in the parametrization in the high likelihood areas.
In the next model M
2
we assume that the A and B columns are indepen-
dent, each having its own discrete distribution. There are two dierent ways to
specify prior information in this case. We can either consider the two columns
separately, each being assumed to be generated by a discrete distribution with
its own prior. Or we could follow the style ofM
0
1
above, with the dierence that
each A value has the same distribution of B-values. Now the rst approach: As-
suming parameters x
A
and x
B
for the two distributions, a row with values i for
A and j for B will have probability x
A
i
x
B
j
. For discrete distribution parameters
x
A
; x
B
, the probability of the data matrix n will be:
p(njx
A
; x
B
) =

n
n
11
; : : : ; n
d
A
d
B

d
A
;d
B
Y
i;j=1
(x
A
i
x
B
j
)
n
ij
=

n
n
11
; : : : ; n
d
A
d
B

d
A
Y
i=1
(x
A
i
)
n
i:
d
B
Y
j=1
(x
B
j
)
n
:j
:
Integration over the priors for A and B gives the data probability given
model M
2
:
p
J
(njM
2
) =
Z
p(njx
A
x
B
)p(x
A
)p(x
B
)dx
A
dx
B
=
Z

n
n
11
; : : : ; n
d
A
d
B

d
A
Y
i=1
(x
A
i
)
n
i:
d
B
Y
j=1
(x
B
j
)
n
:j

Y
i
(x
A
i
)

A
 1
 (d
A

A
)
 (
A
)
d
A
Y
i
(x
B
i
)

B
 1
 (d
B

B
)
 (
B
)
d
B
dx
A
dx
B
=
 (n+ 1)
Q
ij
 (n
ij
+ 1)
 (d
A

A
)
 (
A
)
d
A
 (d
B

B
)
 (
B
)
d
B

Q
i
 (n
i:
+ 
A
)
 (n+ d
A

A
)
Q
j
 (n
:j
+ 
B
)
 (n+ d
B

B
)
:
If we select the uniform prior we obtain less canceling of terms than we did
for M
1
in equation (20):
p
u
(njM
2
) =
 (n+ 1) (d
A
) (d
B
)
 (n+ d
A
) (n+ d
B
)
Q
i
 (n
i:
+ 1)
Q
j
 (n
:j
+ 1)
Q
ij
 (n
ij
+ 1)
: (24)
From equations (22) and (24) we obtain the Bayes factor for the undirected
data model:
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pu
(M
2
jD)
p
u
(M
1
jD)
=
p
u
(njM
2
)
p
u
(njM
1
)
=
 (n+ d
A
d
B
) (d
A
) (d
B
)
 (n+ d
A
) (n+ d
B
) (d
A
d
B
)
Q
j
 (n
:j
+ 1)
Q
i
 (n
i:
+ 1)
Q
ij
 (n
ij
+ 1)
: (25)
The second approach to model independence between A and B gives the
following:
p
u
(njM
0
2
) =
 (n+ 1) (d
A
)
 (n+ d
A
)
Z
(
Y
i

n
i:
n
i1
: : : n
id
B

Y
j
x
n
ij
j
) (d
B
)dx
B
=
 (n+ 1) (d
A
) (d
B
)
 (n+ d
A
)
(
Y
i

n
i:
n
i1
: : : n
id
B

)
Y
j
x
n
:j
j
dx
B
=
 (n+ 1) (d
A
) (d
B
)
 (n+ d
A
) (n+ d
B
)
Q
i
 (n
i:
+ 1)
Q
j
 (n
:j
+ 1)
Q
ij
 (n
ij
+ 1)
: (26)
We can now nd the Bayes factor relating models M
0
1
(equation 23) and M
0
2
(equation 26), with no prior preference of either:
p
u
(M
0
2
jD)
p
u
(M
0
1
jD)
=
p
u
(njM
0
2
)
p
u
(njM
0
1
)
=
Q
j
 (n
:j
+ 1)
Q
i
 (n
i:
+ d
B
)
 (d
B
)
d
A
 1
 (n+ d
B
)
Q
ij
 (n
ij
+ 1)
(27)
Consider now a data matrix with three variables, A, B and C (gure 2). The
analysis of the model M
0
3
where full dependencies are accepted is very similar
to M
1
above (equation 22). For the model M
4
without the link between A
and B we should partition the data matrix by the value of C and multiply the
probabilities of the blocks with the probability of the partitioning dened by C.
Since we are ultimately after the Bayes factor relating M
4
and M
3
respec-
tively M
0
4
and M
0
3
, we can simply multiply the Bayes factors relating M
2
and
M
1
(equation 25) respectively M
0
2
and M
0
1
(equation 27) for each block of the
partition to get the Bayes factors sought:
p
u
(M
4
jD)
p
u
(M
3
jD)
=
p
u
(njM
4
)
p
u
(njM
3
)
=
 (d
A
)
d
C
 (d
B
)
d
C
 (d
A
d
B
)
d
C
Y
c
 (n
::c
+ d
A
d
B
)
Q
j
 (n
:jc
+ 1)
Q
i
 (n
i:c
+ 1)
 (n
::c
+ d
A
) (n
::c
+ d
B
)
Q
ij
 (n
ijc
+ 1)
(28)
and in the directed case we have:
p
u
(M
0
4
jD)
p
u
(M
0
3
jD)
=
p
u
(njM
0
4
)
p
u
(njM
0
3
)
=
 (d
B
)
(d
A
+1)d
C
Y
c
Q
j
 (n
:jc
+ 1)
Q
i
 (n
i:c
+ d
B
)
 (n
::c
+ d
B
)
Q
ij
 (n
ijc
+ 1)
:
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For analysis of directed graphical models in the next section, we must also
be able to compare models M
5
and M
6
of gure 5:
p
u
(M
5
jD)
p
u
(M
6
jD)
=
p
u
(njM
5
)
p
u
(njM
6
)
=
1
 (d
B
)
(d
A
 1)d
C
Y
c
Q
j
 (n
:jc
+ 1)
Q
i
 (n
i:c
+ d
B
)
 (n
::c
+ d
B
)
Q
ij
 (n
ijc
+ 1)
:
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Figure 5: Directed models
5 Graphical model choice - global analysis
If we have many variables, their interdependencies can be modeled as a graph
with vertices corresponding to the variables. The example of gure 6 is from
[23], and shows the dependencies in a data matrix related to heart disease. Of
course, a graph of this kind can give a data probability to the data matrix
in a way analogous to the calculations in the previous section, although the
formulae become rather involved, and the number of possible graphs increases
dramatically with the number of variables. It is completely infeasible to list and
evaluate all graphs if there is more than a handful of variables. An interesting
possibility to simplify the calculations would use some kind of separation, so
that an edge in the model could be given a score independent of the inclusion or
exclusion of most other potential edges. Indeed, the derivations of last section
show how this works. Let C in that example be a compound variable, obtained
by merging columns fc
1
; : : : c
d
g. If two models G and G
0
dier only by the
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Mental Work Lipoproteins
Physical Work Smoking
Anamnesis
Blood Pressure
Figure 6: Symptoms and causes relevant to heart problems
presence and absence of the edge fA;Bg, and if there is no path between A and
B except through vertex set C, then the expressions for p(njM
4
) and p(njM
3
)
above will become factors of the expressions for p(njG) and p(njG
0
), respectively,
and the other factors will be the same in the two expressions. Thus, the Bayes
factor relating the probabilities of G and G
0
is the same as that relatingM
4
and
M
3
. This result is independent of the choice of distributions and priors of the
model, since the structure of the derivation follows the structure of the graph
of the model - it is equally valid for Gaussian or other data models, as long as
the parameters of the participating distributions are assumed independent in
the prior assumptions. A beautiful abstract analysis of this phenomenon can be
found in (Dawid and Lauritzen[12]).
We can now think of various 'greedy' methods for building high probability
interaction graphs relating the variables (columns in the data matrix). It is
convenient and customary to restrict attention to either decomposable(chordal)
graphs or directed acyclic graphs. Chordal graphs are fundamental in many
applications of describing relationships between variables (typically variables in
systems of equations or inequalities). They can be characterized in many dif-
ferent but equivalent ways, see (Rose [29], Rose, Lueker and Tarjan[30]). One
simple way is to consider a decomposable graph as consisting of the union of
a number of maximal complete graphs (cliques, or maximally connected sub-
graphs), in such a way that (i) there is at least one vertex that appears in only
one clique (a simplicial vertex), and (ii) if an edge to a simplicial vertex is re-
moved, another decomposable graph remains, and (iii) the graph without any
edges is decomposable. A characteristic feature of a simplicial vertex is that its
neighbors are completely connected. This recursive denition can be reversed
into a generation procedure: Given a decomposable graph G on the set of ver-
tices, nd two vertices s and n such that (i): s is simplicial, i.e., its neighbors are
completely connected, (ii): n is connected to all neighbors of s. Then the graph
20
G0
obtained by adding the edge between s and n to G is also decomposable.
We will call such an edge a permissible edge of G. This procedure describes a
generation structure (a directed acyclic graph whose vertices are decomposable
graphs on the set of vertices) containing all decomposable graphs on the vari-
able set. An interesting feature of this generation process is that it is easy to
compute the Bayes factor comparing the posterior probabilities of the graphs G
and G
0
as graphical models of the data: Let s correspond to A, n to B and the
compound variable obtained by fusing the neighbors of s to C in the analysis of
section 5. Without explicit prior model probabilities we have:
p(GjD)
p(G
0
jD)
=
p(njM
3
)
p
u
(njM
4
)
: (29)
A search for high probability graphs can now be organized as follows:
1. Start from the graph G
0
without edges.
2. Repeat: nd a number of permissible edges that give the highest Bayes
factor, and add it if the factor is greater than 1. Keep a set of highest probability
graphs encountered.
3. Then repeat: For the high probability graphs found in the previous step,
nd simplicial edges whose removal increases the Bayes factor the most (or
decreases it the least).
For each graph kept in this process, its Bayes factor relative to G
0
can be
found by multiplying the Bayes factors in the generation sequence. A procedure
similar to this one is reported by (Madigan and Raftery[24]), and its results on
small variable sets was found good, in that it found the best graphs reported
in other approaches. It must be noted, however, that we have now passed into
the realm of approximate analysis, since we cannot (yet) know that we will nd
all high probability graphs. One splendid example of this is where we have
many binary categorical columns, all generated randomly and independently of
each other except the last one which is the parity function of the other ones.
If we start searching from the empty graph, we will never nd this relationship
since the intermediate graphs will have low probability. Likewise, if some ar-
bitrary subset of the columns are interrelated by a parity constraint it seems
unlikely although possible that we will nd it even if we start the search from
the saturated model (graph with all edges).
Another family of graphical models are the directed acyclic models. They
can be treated similarly, since here we check locally for a variable B that has
been found dependent on a set C, whether it can be inferred also to depend on
variable A. We compare thus models M
5
and M
6
of gure 4. The inclusion or
exclusion of the arrow from A to B can be inferred independent of all arrows
not going to B. A problem with directed graphical models is that dierent
acyclic graphs can represent the same family of probability distributions, and
this requires some careful argumentation.
6 Graphical model choice - categorical, ordinal
and Gaussian variables
We now consider data matrices made up from ordinal and real valued data, and
then matrices consisting of both ordinal, real and categorical data. The standard
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choice for a real valued data model is the univariate or multivariate Gaussian or
normal distribution. It has nice theoretical properties manifesting themselves
in such forms as the central limit theorem, the least squares method, principal
components, etc. However, it must be noted that it is also unsatisfactory for
many data sets occurring in practice, because of its narrow tail and because
many real life distributions deviate terribly from it. Several approaches to solve
this problem are available. One is to consider a variable as being obtained by
mixing several normal distributions. This is a special case of the classication or
segmentation problem discussed below. Another is to disregard the distribution
over the real line, and considering the variable as just being made up of an
ordered set of values. This leads naturally to the recursive splitting of the data
set by a decision tree, also discussed below.
7 Missing values and errors in data matrix
Data collected from experiments are seldom perfect. The problem of missing
and erroneous data is a vast eld in the statistics literature. First of all there
is a possibility that 'missingness' of data values are signicant for the analysis,
in which case missingness should be modeled as an ordinary data value. Then
the problem has been internalized, and the analysis can proceed as usual, with
the important dierence that the missing values are not available for analysis.
A more sceptical approach was developed by Ramoni and Sebastiani[27], who
consider an option to regard the missing values as adversaries (the conclusions
on dependence would then be true no matter what the missing values are). The
other possibility is that missingness is known to have nothing to do with the
objectives of the analysis. For example, in a medical application, if data is
missing because of the bad condition of the patient, missingness is signicant
if the investigation is concerned with patients. But if data is missing because
of unavailability of equipment, it is probably not - unless maybe if the investi-
gation is related to hospital quality. In Bayesian data analysis, the problem of
missing or erroneous data creates signicant complications, as we will see. As
an example, consider the analysis of the two-column data matrix with binary
categorical variables A and B, analyzed against models M
1
and M
2
of section
5. Suppose we obtained n
00
, n
01
, n
10
and n
11
cases with the values 00, 01,
etc. We then have a posterior Dirichlet distribution with parameters n
ij
for the
probabilities of the four possible cases. If we now receive a case where both A
and B are unknown, it is reasonable that this case is altogether ignored. But
what shall we do if a case arrives where A is known, say 0, but B is unknown?
One possibility is to waste the entire case, but this is not orthodox Bayesian,
since we are not making use of information we have. Another possibility is to
use the current posterior to estimate a pdf for the missing value, in our case the
probability that B has value 0 is p
0
= n
00
=n
0:
. So our posterior is now either a
Dirichlet with parameters n
00
, n
01
  1, n
10
  1 and n
11
  1 (probability p
0
) or
one with parameters n
00
  1, n
01
, n
10
  1 and n
11
  1 (probability 1  p
0
). But
this means that the posterior is now a weighted average of two Dirichlet distri-
butions, in other terms, is not a Dirichlet distribution at all! As the number of
missing values increases, the number of terms in the posterior will increase ex-
ponentially, and the whole advantage with conjugate distributions will be lost.
So wasting the whole case seems to be a reasonable option unless we nd a more
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clever way to proceed.
The related case of errors in data is more dicult to treat. How do we
describe data where there are known uncertainties in the recording procedure?
This is a problem worked on for centuries when it comes to real valued quan-
tities as measured in physics and astronomy, and is one of the main features
of interpretation of physics experiments. When it comes to categorical data
there is less help in the literature - an obvious alternative is to relate recorded
vs actual values of discrete variables as a probability distribution, or - which is
fairly expedient in our approach - as an equivalent sample.
8 Decision trees
Decision trees are typically used when we want to predict a variable - the class
variable - from other - explanatory - variables in a case, and we have a data
matrix of known cases. When modeling data with decision trees, we are usually
trying to segment the data set into ranges - n-dimensional boxes of which some
are unbounded - such that a particular variable - the class variable - is fairly
constant over each box. If the class variable is truly constant in each box, we
have a tree that is consistent with respect to the data. This means that for
new cases, where the class variable is not directly available, it can be well pre-
dicted by the box into which the case falls. The method is suitable where the
variables used for prediction are of any kind (categorical, ordinal or numerical)
and where the predicted variable is categorical or ordinal with a small domain.
There are several ecient ways to heuristically build good decision trees, and
it is a central technique in the eld of machine learning. Practical experience
has given many cases were the predictive performance of decision trees is good,
but also many counter-intuitive phenomena have been uncovered by practical
experiments. Recently, several treatments of decision trees have been published
where it is discussed whether or not the smallest possible tree consistent with
all cases is the best one. This turned out not to be the case, and the argu-
ment that a smallest decision tree should be preferred because of some kind
of Occam's razor argument is apparently not valid, neither in theory nor in
practise[34, 2]. The Bayesian approach gives the right information on the credi-
bility and generalizing power of a decision tree. It is explained in recent papers
by (Chipman, George and McCullogh[9]) and by (Paass and Kindermann[26]).
A decision tree statistical model is one where a number of boxes are dened on
one set of variables by recursive splitting of one box into two by splitting the
range of one designated variable into two. Data are assumed to be generated by
a discrete distribution over the boxes, and for each box it is assumed that the
class variable value is generated by another discrete distribution. Both these
distributions are given uninformative Dirichlet prior distributions, and thus the
posterior probability of a decision tree can be computed from data. Since larger
trees have more parameters, there is an automatic penalization of large trees,
but the distribution of cases into boxes also enters the picture, so it is not clear
that the smallest tree giving perfect classication will be preferred, or even that
a consistent tree will be preferred over an inconsistent one. The decision trees
we described here do not give a clear cut decision on the value of the decision
variable for a case, but a probability distribution over values. If the probability
distribution is not peaked at a specic class value, then this indicates that pos-
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sibly more data must be collected before a decision can be made. Also, since
the name of this data model indicates its use for decision making, one can get
better trees for an application by including information about the utility of the
decision in the form of a loss function and by comparing trees based on the
expected utility rather than model probability.
For a decision tree T with d boxes data with c classes, and where the number
of cases in box i with class value k is n
ik
, and n = n
::
, we have with uniform
priors on both the assignment of case to box and of class within box,
p(DjT ) =
 (n+ 1) (d)
 (n+ d)
Y
i
 (n
i:
+ 1) (c)
 (n
i:
+ c)
(30)
However, in order to compare two trees T and T
0
, we would have to form the
set of intersection boxes and ask about the probability of nding the data with
a common parameter over the boxes belonging to a common box of T relative
to the probability of the data when the parameters are common in boxes of T
0
.
For the case where T and T
0
only dier by splitting of one box i into i
0
and i
00
,
the calculation is easy (n
i
00
j
+ n
i
0
j
= n
ij
):
p(DjT
0
)
p(DjT )
=
 (n
i:
+ c)
 (n
i
0
:
+ c) (n
i
00
:
+ c)
Y
j
 (n
i
0
j
+ 1) (n
i
00
j
+ 1)
 (n
ij
+ 1)
(31)
9 Segmentation - Latent variables
Segmentation and latent variable analysis is directed at describing the data set
as a collection of subsets, each having simpler descriptions than the full data
matrix. Suppose data set D is partitioned into d
c
classes fD
(i)
g, and each of
these has a high posterior probability p(D
(i)
jM
i
) wrt some model set fM
i
g.
Then we think that the classication is a good model for the data. However,
some problems remain to consider. First, what is it that we compare the clas-
sication against, and second, how do we accomplish the partitioning of the
cases? The rst question is the simplest to answer: we compare a classication
model against some other model, based on classication or not. The second
is trickier, since the introduction of this section is somewhat misleading. The
prior information for a model based on classication must have some informa-
tion about classes, but it does not have an explicit division of the data into
classes available. Indeed, if we were allowed to make this division into classes
on our own, seeking the highest posterior class model probabilities, we would
probably over-t by using the same data twice - once for class assignment and
once for posterior model probability computation. The statistical model gen-
erating segmented data could be the following: A case is rst assigned to a
class by a discrete distribution obtained from a suitable uninformative Dirichlet
distribution, and then its visible attributes are assigned by a class-dependent
distribution. This model can be used to compute a probability of the data ma-
trix, and then, via Bayes rule, a Bayes factor relating the model with another
one, e.g., one without classes or with a dierent number of classes. One can also
have a variable number of classes and evaluate by nding the posterior distribu-
tion of the number of classes. The data probability is obtained by integrating,
over the Dirichlet distribution, the sum over all assignments of cases to classes,
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of the assignment probability times the product of all resulting case probabil-
ities according to the respective class model. Needless to say, this integration
is feasible only for a handful of cases where the data is too meager to permit
any kind of signicant conclusion on the number of classes and their distribu-
tions. The most well-known procedures for automatic classication are built on
expectation maximization. With this technique, a set of class parameters are re-
ned by assigning cases to classes probabilistically, with the probability of each
case membership determined by the likelihood vector for it in the current class
parameters[8]. We can also solve the problem with the MCMC approach[28].
The MCMC approach to classication is the following: Assume that we have
a data matrix and want a classication of its cases which makes the attributes
independent. Dene a class assignment randomly, and compute the probability
of data, given the model with independent attributes, as in (24) which is easy to
generalize to more attributes. The MCMC will now implement a move function,
proposing a changed class for some case. The move is accepted if the posterior
probability increases, or otherwise by a probability given by the ratio of new
to old data probability (see section 11). This procedure is reasonably ecient,
since it is possible to evaluate the class probabilities incrementally, by keeping
just the current contingency table for each class and updating it incrementally.
Since absolute probabilities are held updated, we also avoid a common com-
plication in MCMC applications arising when the dimension of the parameter
space changes. Although it can sometimes be avoided it is not always so. The
reversible jump process was designed to cope with this phenomenon[6].
10 Association rules
Association rules are special sets of rules used to predict data in data mining.
The literature on association rules emphasizes rapid extraction, since typically
a data matrix has very many potential association rules and the data matri-
ces considered are very large. An association rule is written A ! B, where A
and B are conditions on a data case. They can be either dened by giving a
predicate on the value of an attribute, or as a conjunction of such conditions
for several attributes. In the literature, binary attributes are often assumed.
These usefulness of this rule depends on how well it satises the intuitive con-
dition of the rule: Whenever A is true for a case, B is also true. The support
of the rule is the fraction of cases where both A and B are true, whereas the
condence is the fraction of cases with A true where also B is true. The lift
of a rule is the factor by which its condence exceeds the condence we would
have with in-dependency between A and B, computing in a ML framework,
i.e., n
AB
n
::
=(n
A:
n
:B
), where the notation is an obvious adaptation of the con-
tingency table notation used previously. Clearly, the concept of lift assumes a
large database, where statistical uctuation can be ignored. In order to asses
the signicance of an association rule, we need the machinery of Bayes factors,
and then we can easily assess the generalization expectable from a proposed
rule. In short, let the signicance of a rule be the Bayes factor between a model
that gives dependence between A and B and a model that does not. This gives
us a simpler version of the decision tree rule, equation (31):
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s(A! B) =
 (n
::
+ 2)
 (n
A:
+ c) (n
A:
+ c)
 (n
AB
+ 1) (n
AB
+ 1)
 (n
:B
+ 1)
 (n
AB
+ 1) (n
AB
+ 1)
 (n
:B
+ 1)
(32)
Since the signicance depends on four quantities which can have a very
large span of values in practical applications, this concept seems necessary for
throwing out rules that cannot be expected to generalize because either the data
base, the support or the lift (or some combination) is too small. However, there
are more dangers in applying data mining results, particularly the problem of
biased sampling which no test on sampled data can reveal.
Mining of large les for association rules typically reveals very large quanti-
ties of signicant rules. Many papers have been devoted to nding an interesting
subset of such rules. Two basic approaches exist: in one, a measure of inter-
estingness or surprisingness is dened for a particular rule, in another a rule is
evaluated in the context of an already existing set.
11 Approximate analysis with Metropolis-Hastings
simulation
Several of the cases mentioned previously, where analytical solutions become
infeasible because of breakdown of the simple conjugacy principle (missing and
erroneous values) or the large number of models to be considered (graphical
models on many variables) or because of the analytical diculties in computing
data probability (classication) have been separately attacked with monte carlo
methods. We will outline a method solving all these cases at once.
The basic problem solved by MCMCmethods is sampling from a multivariate
distribution over many variables. The distribution can be given generically as
p(x; y; z; : : : ; w). If some variable, e.g., y, represents measured signals, then
the actual values measured, say a, can be substituted, and sampling will be
from a conditional distribution p(x; a; z; : : : ; w). If some other variable, say x,
represents the measured quantity, then sampling and selecting the x variable will
give samples from the posterior of x given the measurements. In other words,
we will get a best possible estimation of the quantity given the measurements
and the statistical model of the measurement process.
The two basic methods for MCMC computation are the Gibbs sampler and
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Both generate a Markov chain with states
over the domain of a multivariate target distribution and with the target dis-
tribution as its unique limit distribution. Both exist in several more or less
rened versions. The Metropolis algorithm has the advantages that it does not
require sampling from the conditional distributions of the target distribution
but only nding the quotient of the distribution at two arbitrary given points,
and it can be chosen from a set with better convergence properties. A thorough
introduction is given by Neal[25]. To sum it up, MCMC methods can be used
to estimate distributions that are not tractable analytically or numerically. We
get real estimates of posterior distributions and not just approximate maxima
of functions. On the negative side, the Markov chains generated have high au-
tocorrelation, so a sample over a sequence of steps can give a highly misleading
empirical distribution, much narrower than the real posterior. Although signi-
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cant advances have been made in the area of convergence assessment and choice
of samples, this problem is not yet completely solved.
The Metropolis-Hastings sampling method is organized as follows: given the
pdf p(q) of a state variable q over a state space Q, and an essentially arbitrary
symmetric move function m(q; q
0
), a sequence of states is created in a Markov
chain. In state q, draw q
0
according to the move function m. If p(q
0
)=p(q) > 1,
let q
0
be the new state. Otherwise, let q
0
be the new state with probability
p(q
0
)=p(q), otherwise keep state q. It is easy to verify that p(q) is a stable
distribution of the chain, and from general Markov chain theory there are several
conditions that ensure that there is only one limiting distribution and that it
will always be reached asymptotically. It is much more dicult to say when we
have a provably good sample, and in practice all the diculties of hill-climbing
optimization methods must be dealt with in order to assess convergence.
Nevertheless, there have been great successes with this method for those
cases of Bayesian analysis where closed form solutions do not exist. With var-
ious adaptations of the method, it is possible to express multivariate data as
a mixture of multivariate distributions and to nd the posterior distribution of
the number of classes and their parameters [14, 15, 16, 28].
The missing data problem can also be solved in the sense that parameters
and dependence structures can be estimated with missing data without the
simple expedient of wasting incomplete cases.
The structure of a graphical model can be obtained as a sample from the
posterior distribution[4, 13].
11.1 Example: Univariate Gaussian Mixture modeling
Consider the problem of deciding, for a set of real numbers, the most plausible
decompositions of the distribution as a weighted sum (mixture) of a number
of distributions each being a univariate normal (Gaussian) distribution. This
problem has signicance when we try to nd 'discrete' circumstances behind a
measured variable which is also inuenced by various chance uctuations. Note
that a single column of discrete data is not decomposable in this way because a
mixture of discrete distributions is again a discrete distribution. But a mixture
of normal distributions is not itself a normal distribution. In the frequently
used Enzyme problem[28], the discovered components, if any, could correspond
to genetic factors in a population. There are quite many approaches to solve this
problem, and many carry over to the more general problem of modeling a matrix
of reals as coming from a mixture of multivariate Gaussians[]. The approach
presented here seems to have an advantage in that it is not necessary to include
the parameters (mean and variance) of the participating Gaussians. It simulates
only the assignment of variables to classes, and for each such assignment it
computes the exact posterior of the data including the latent class variable.
This posterior is, for class I :
p(DjI) = jI j!
Z
Y
i2I
p(d
i
j)p()d; (33)
If we assume a uniform prior for the distribution over classes, this factor will
only depend on the total sample size and can be ignored (see equation (20)),
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so we just multiply together the contributions from each class to get the model
probability for the current class assignment.
Just as the discrete probability distribution has the Dirichlet conjugate fam-
ily, the Gaussian univariate has a conjugate family, which is a distribution over
the mean and variance parameters of the Gaussian. It is possible to dene
priors were the mean and variance parameters of the Gaussian are a priori in-
dependent, see [7], but with that prior the data probability is not expressible in
closed form (it involves the exponential integral). For the natural conjugate of
a Gaussian, in the notation of Bernardo and Smith[3], we use the inverse of the
variance as a parameter (the precision) and have the Gaussian distribution:
f(xj; ) =
r

2
e
 =2(x )
2
; (34)
and the natural prior for  and  is a normal-gamma distribution where the
precision  is drawn from a gamma distribution with parameters  > 0 and
 > 0. The mean  is then normally distributed with mean 
0
and precision
n
0
, where n
0
> 0 and 
0
are new constants:
p(j; ) =


 ()

 1
e
 
(35)
p(j
0
; n
0
; ) =
r
n
0

2
e
 n
0
=2( 
0
)
2
; (36)
The joint probability distribution is thus:
p(D;; ) =


 ()

 1
e
 
(

2
)
n=2
e
 =2
i
(x
i
 )
2
r
n
0

2
e
 n
0
=2( 
0
)
2
(37)
and we want to obtain the data probability by integrating over  and ,
which after some calculation and the substitutions n
0
s
2
= x
2
i
+ n
0

2
0
, n
0
m =
x
i
+ n
0

0
and n
0
= n+ n
0
yields:
p(Djn
0
; ; ) =


 ()
n!(2)
 n=2
r
n
0
n
0
Z
1
0
e
 n
0
=2(s
2
 m
2
)

n=2+ 1
e
 
d
(38)
The value of the integral is the inverse normalization constant for a gamma
distribution with parameters (+ n=2; + n
0
=2(s
2
 m
2
)) and can be obtained
by substituting in (35). The probability of data D and class assignment fI
c
g
c2C
is then
p(D; fI
c
g
c2C
) = (2)
n=2
p
n
0

c
n
c
! (+ n
c
=2)
p
n
0
c
( + n
0
c
=2(s
2
c
 m
2
c
))
(39)
The choice of the parameters can be made so that  and  are fairly evenly
distributed over a range covering the values found likely by inspection of the
data. The coupling of the precisions of the distributions of the data points
and of the prior class mean seems to constrain this model in a bad way, since
it penalizes sharp peaks in the outskirts of the distribution. A theoretically
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sound way to deal with this problem is to assign a so called hyper-prior for the
parameter 
0
. The result of such an exercise is a hierarchical model.
Equation (39) gives an exact probability of data and class assignment, given
parameters 
0
, ,  and n   0. The Metropolis-Hastings proposal will be a
reassignment of the class of one data point. This changes the n
c
, m
c
and s
2
c
values of two classes with amounts easily computed. The resulting density ratio
of the distribution (39) which controls the probability of taking the proposed
move, is also easy to compute. In the hierarchical model we would also have a
class-specic prior mean 
c
, which is also recomputed in a move. It is practical
to forbid two class means to switch by these moves, so that the classes can
always be recognized by their relative prior means.
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